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A Multidimensional Analysis of What Not to Wear in
the Workplace: Hijabs and Natural Hair
D. Wendy Greene*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article challenges a relatively universal judicial and societal
assumption that employers’ enactment and enforcement of grooming
codes are inconsequential to women’s access to, and inclusion in,
American workplaces. Specifically, this article provides a multidimensional analysis of workplace grooming codes, shedding light on the
1
comparable journeys of Black and Muslim women whose hair and
hair coverings are subject to employer regulation. This article attempts
to fill a gap at the intersection of race, religion, and gender within the
scholarly literature examining workplace grooming codes, which deprive and tend to deprive women of color employment opportunities
for which they are qualified. In doing so, I acknowledge that Black
and Muslim identities are not mutually exclusive, as those who identify as Black or African descendant may also be Muslim. Further, this
*
Professor of Law and Director of Faculty Development, Cumberland School of Law at
Samford University. I am indebted to the FIU Law Review and Professor Kerri Stone for the
invitation to participate in this wonderful symposium in addition to the law review editorial
board for their unwavering professionalism, patience, and assistance throughout. Enormous
thanks to: Ashley Rhea (Class of 2014) for outstanding research assistance and insightful dialogue throughout the development of this article; Khaula Hadeed (Class of 2014) for her genuine
engagement in and encouragement of this project; and Professor Deleso Alford for her constructive feedback on this and related articles. As always, I am grateful for my parents, family, and
friends for their abiding love and support in all that I do. This article is written in the spirit of
sisterhood; for, we are our sisters’ keepers.
1
Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw has explained that “Black” deserves capitalization because “Blacks like Asians [and] Latinos . . . constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.” Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332
n.2 (1988) (citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and State: An Agenda
for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 515, 516 (1982)). Additionally, Professor
Neil Gotanda contends that the capitalization of Black is appropriate as it “has deep political
and social meaning as a liberating term.” Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is
Colorblind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 n.12 (1991). I agree with both Professors Crenshaw and
Gotanda, and for both reasons, throughout this Article when I reference people of African descent individually and collectively the word, Black, will be represented as a proper noun.
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article in no way purports that the experience of Muslim women and
Black women is a monolith, nor does it project that the course for
2
Muslim women who choose to wear a hijab and Black women who
choose to don a natural hairstyle is identical in the workplace and beyond.
This article simply aims to illuminate how these women, who are
racialized as non-white due to their physical appearance and/or their
religious faith and observances, share similar experiences as it relates
to workplace inclusion and exclusion vis à vis what adorns their heads.
Indeed, workplace prohibitions against Black women’s natural hairstyles and Muslim women’s donning of a hijab are closely aligned
forms of race and gender-based discrimination, triggering parallel actual as well as perceived stigmatization, vulnerability, and exclusion
for these women of color, which civil rights constituencies have not
fully exposed or addressed. First, Part II briefly details the prohibitions against private workplace discrimination under Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, and delineates the need for a multidimensional
analysis of grooming codes banning and limiting hijabs and natural
hairstyles in the workplace. In so doing, this article draws upon the
works of notable critical race and sexuality theorists in its contention
that a “multidimensional” analysis of the discrimination that women
of color as a collective experience in the workplace—at the intersection of race, religion, and gender—is vital for a deeper understanding
of the civil rights issues at stake, as well as for increased and sustained
civil rights advocacy challenging the legality of such grooming codes.
Part III examines a recent Title VII case decided by the Third
Circuit involving three Muslim women’s unsuccessful challenge
against their employer’s “no headgear” policy in EEOC v. Geo Group
Incorporated. Next, this article compares GEO Group to the seminal
Title VII case involving Black women’s challenge to an employer’s
prohibition against braided hairstyles in Rogers v. American Airlines
and its progeny, namely Pitts v. Wild Adventures: a braids case decided
over thirty years after Rogers. Part III synthesizes management and
judicial responses in GEO Group, Rogers, and Pitts. This Part demonstrates the ways in which management effectuates a particular gender
subordination, stigmatization, and exclusion via its enactment and
enforcement of grooming policies against Black and Muslim women.
This Part also illustrates the resulting vulnerability, disempowerment,
and difference in treatment, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment that Black and Muslim women encounter due to manage2
Throughout this article, I refer to Muslim women’s head coverings interchangeably as a
hijab, khimar, and headscarf.
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ment responses to their hair-related decisions and judicial legitimatization of these responses.
Part IV provides a multidimensional analysis of the legal protection for the donning of hijabs and natural hairstyles in private workplaces as well as its socio-political and personal meaning for Muslim
and Black women. Accordingly, this Part situates employer appearance codes affecting Black and Muslim women within a broader social
context. Part IV also elucidates unifying and distinctive threads
amongst Black and Muslim women who don natural hairstyles and
hijabs. Lastly, Part V proposes that the meaning of Title VII’s plain
language and cross-coalitional advocacy should be enhanced so that
antidiscrimination law and doctrine can meaningfully attend to the
deprivation of equal employment opportunities for Black and Muslim
women, which oft goes under-discussed in our civil rights discourse
and unredressed within our discrimination frameworks.
II. RELIGIOUS, SEX, AND RACE DISCRIMINATION IN THE PRIVATE
WORKPLACE
A. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act expressly prohibits covered
employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of race,
3
religion, sex, national origin, and color. Expressly, section 703(a) of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful for employers
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race,
4
color, religion, sex, or national origin.

3

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2000). Where an employment practice is facially discriminatory on the basis of sex, religion, or national origin, the employer can escape Title VII liability
by demonstrating the employment practice is a “bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(e) (2000). Where the employment practice is not expressly discriminatory, a plaintiff may
prove unlawful discrimination either through direct or circumstantial evidence. Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). Though not mandatory, when analyzing circumstantial
cases of intentional discrimination, the vast majority of courts apply the burden-shifting framework promulgated by the Supreme Court: a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that raises
4
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The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted section 703(a) as prohibiting
5
not only intentional discrimination, but also unintentional discrimina6
tion on the enumerated proscribed grounds. Generally, Black women’s challenges against workplace grooming code barring natural hairstyles have been theorized as a hybrid form of intentional and unintentional discrimination or simply as a form of intentional discrimina7
tion. These grooming codes cases are analyzed through alternative
theoretical constructs; the grooming codes are: discriminatory on their
face; unequally burdensome or disproportionately impactful to Black
women; and/or unlawfully motivated by race and/or gender though
facially neutral policies.
Generally, Title VII religious-based challenges against grooming
codes have been analyzed under an accommodation framework that
does not necessarily consider the employer’s intentionality in enacting
8
the appearance mandates. Title VII defines religion as inclusive of
“all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice
9
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”
Accordingly, a covered employer also violates Title VII’s prohibition
against religious discrimination if it fails to make good faith efforts to
reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious observance, practice, and belief that conflicts with an employment requirement of

a presumption of unlawful discrimination; the defendant rebuts this presumption by articulating
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; and to satisfy her burden of production and persuasion, a
discrimination plaintiff must produce persuasive evidence that the employer’s asserted reason is
either false and/or that the employer’s underlying motivation for the adverse employment action
was more likely than not a discriminatory reason. See generally McDonnell Douglas v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
5
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1970) (holding that “Congress directed
the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation”)
(emphasis in original). In 1991, Congress codified the disparate impact theory, which permits
Title VII plaintiffs to succeed on claims of unintentional discrimination by demonstrating that an
employment practice disproportionately impacted a protected group and an alternative practice
with a less discriminatory impact existed which the employer refused to implement—even if the
employer demonstrates that the challenged employment practice is job related and consistent
with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)–(C) (2000).
6
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1970).
7
See, e.g., Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Jenkins v. Blue
Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976); McManus v. MCI Commc’n. Corp, 748
A.2d 949 (2000); Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *4-6
(M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008).
8
See, e.g., EEOC v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (D. Ariz. 2006); EEOC v.
Kelly Serv., 598 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2010); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp.
2d 1272 (N.D. Okla. 2011).
9
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
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10

which the employer is aware. The employer is not required to im11
plement the employee’s proposed accommodation; an employer
meets its statutory obligation when it offers any reasonable accom12
modation to the employee. However, an employer is not obligated to
accommodate an employee’s religious observance, practice, or belief if
an employer can demonstrate that the proposed accommodation is
13
unreasonable or that it would incur an undue hardship in doing so.
14
Yet, an employer’s claims of undue hardship must be real and not
15
speculative.
This article’s subsequent examination of EEOC v. The GEO
Group, Rogers v. American Airlines, and Pitts v. Wild Adventures
evinces a particular experience under the law that Black and Muslim
women may face when private employers regulate what they can and
cannot adorn on their heads in the workplace—irrespective of the
legal framework applied to their discrimination claims. By examining
these Title VII cases initiated by both Black and Muslim women, one
can better appreciate unifying concerns and encounters for women of
color whose hair and head coverings are expressly deemed violative of
institutionalized workplace norms in light of the parallel ways in
which employers and courts have responded to their claims of unlawful discrimination. Accordingly, these grooming codes cases demarcate
the ways in which legal doctrine ensconces the prevailing cultural
norm—gendered and racialized—which maintains exclusionary barriers on the basis of religion, race, and gender the law was designed to
eliminate. A multidimensional analysis of GEO Group, Rogers, and
Pitts therefore illustrates the ways in which legal and social norms
confine the privilege and freedom of a subset of working women of
10 See Chambers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1020 (holding that an employer’s
duty to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs is triggered when an employer actually
knows or should reasonably know that an employee’s religious beliefs conflict with an employment requirement).
11 See Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1986).
12 Id. at 68. The employer is not required to adopt the employee’s proposed accommodation; to fulfill its statutory obligation the employer must simply propose any reasonable accommodation that resolves the employee’s religious conflict. See id.
13 An accommodation is unreasonable or imposes an undue hardship when it violates the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, a nondiscriminatory seniority system, engenders
more than a de minimis (monetary or non-monetary) cost for the employer or results in differential treatment between employees. See id. at 71. See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 76-84 (1977).
14 See Brown v. Polk, 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (enumerating ways in which an employer can satisfy its burden of production and persuasion on the issue of undue hardship based
upon Title VII precedent).
15 See Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div. 589 F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir.
1978).
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color and leave them uniquely vulnerable to the imposition of discriminatory grooming mandates by employers. Thus, this article’s concurrent treatment of Muslim and Black women’s Title VII challenges
against employer grooming mandates elucidates the limits of current
antidiscrimination jurisprudence to effectuate substantive equality
and inclusion in the workplace for women of color.
B.

Toward a Multidimensional Analysis of Workplace Grooming
Codes that Regulate the Ways in which Women of Color Adorn
Their Heads

Elsewhere, I issued a call for renewed attention to and analyses
of: unfettered racialized and gendered workplace grooming codes that
regulate Black women’s hairstyles; attendant deprivation of Black
women’s acquisition and maintenance of employment; and the resulting denial of civil rights protections against race and gender discrimi16
nation for Black women. This article builds upon yet broadens the
scope of my previous scholarly investigation of appearance codes in
that it illuminates the collective experience of Muslim and Black
women subjected to workplace regulations of their hair. In doing so, it
provides a more nuanced and holistic perspective on this contemporary civil rights issue by putting forth a “multidimensional” analysis of
workplace grooming codes that ban the natural hairstyles and head
coverings of women of color. In its “multidimensional” examination
of private employers’ regulations of Black and Muslim women’s hair,
and their maintenance of gender-based exclusion, subordination, and
stigmatization at the intersection of race and religion, namely, this article draws upon the theoretical insights of notable critical race and
sexuality scholars, Professors Darren Hutchinson and Francisco Val17
des. As Professor Hutchinson explains, the notion of “multidimensionality” within race-sex equality doctrine is an extension of a fundamental critical race theoretical intervention known as
“intersectionality”—most notably advanced by Professor Kimberlé
Crenshaw in her seminal article, Demarginalizing the Intersection of

16 See D. Wendy Greene, Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair…
in the Workplace, 14 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 405, 430 (2011). See also generally D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s
Hair (and Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got to Do With It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355 (2008)
(hereinafter What’s Hair Got to Do With It).
17 See generally Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory:
Majoritarianism, Multidisciplinary, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship or Legal
Scholars as Cultural Warriers, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1998); see also Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an
Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285 (2001).
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Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doc18
trine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics.
In Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, Professor
Crenshaw delineates the lack of recognition of and remedy for the
specific discrimination that Black women suffer due to the interaction
between their race and gender within antidiscrimination doctrine because courts have conceived discrimination on the basis of race and
gender as mutually exclusive concepts rather than mutually reinforc19
ing constructs. According to Crenshaw, in race and sex discrimination cases, courts ignore the “multidimensionality” of Black women
and have viewed discrimination and subordination that Black women
20
contend experiencing along a “single categorical axis.” Therefore,
“the boundaries of sex and race discrimination doctrine are defined
respectively by white women’s and Black men’s experiences. Per this
view, Black women are protected [under antidiscrimination law] only
to the extent that their experiences coincide with the experiences of
21
either of these two groups.” Such an essentialist concentration “on
the [condition of the] most privileged group members,” i.e., white
women or Black men, within antidiscrimination doctrine and jurisprudence according to Crenshaw, “marginalizes those who are multiplyburdened and obscures claims that cannot be understood as resulting
22
from discrete sources of discrimination.” Consequently, Professor
Crenshaw specifically advocated for the deployment of an “intersectional” framework within antidiscrimination doctrine as well as feminist and anti-racist platforms which seeks to acknowledge and dismantle the particular forms of subordination that Black women experience as “Black women—not the sum of race and sex discrimination,
23
but as Black women.”
In his article, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination,
Professor Darren Hutchinson traces the evolution of intersectionality
theory since Professor Crenshaw’s seminal work and explains that
“post-intersectionality” theorists—for example, “race-sexuality critics,
whose scholarship examines the relationships among racism, patriar24
chy, class domination, and heterosexism” —have expanded the con18 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139 (1989).
19 See generally id.
20 Id. at 139-40.
21 Id. at 143.
22 Id. at 140.
23 Id. at 149.
24 Hutchinson, supra note 17, at 309.
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tours of intersectionality theory to novel “substantive and conceptual
25
terrains;” Professor Hutchinson’s and Professor Valdes’ notion of
“multidimensionality” is one such analytical tool located within the
evolutionary thread of intersectionality theory. According to Professor Hutchinson,
[m]ultidimensionality “recognize[s] the inherent complexity of
systems of oppression . . . and the social identity categories
around which social power and disempowerment are distributed.” Multidimensionality posits that the various forms of identity
and oppression are “inextricably and forever intertwined” and
that essentialist equality theories “invariably reflect the experiences of class- and race-privileged” individuals. Multidimensionality, therefore, arises out of and is informed by intersectionality
26
theory.
Professor Valdes further argues that multidimensional theory and
praxis are needed for transformative social justice advocacy, as multidimensionality
reminds all outgroups that all forms of identity hierarchy impinge
on the social and legal interests of their members: biases based
on race/ethnicity, sex/gender, sexual orientation and other identity features are directly relevant to each of those overlapping
groups' social and legal interests because all of those biases impact members of every such group. Multidimensionality tends to
promote awareness of patterns as well as particularities in social
relations by studying in an interconnected way the specifics of
27
subordination.
Accordingly, though multidimensionality emanates from, and is
shaped by, intersectionality theory, multidimensionality is distinctive
in its analysis of subordination and privilege among individuals who
may similarly experience a form (or multiple forms) of social marginalization.
In proposing a multidimensional framework within equality doctrine, which addresses heterosexual normativity and privilege, Professor Hutchinson submits that “a multidimensional analysis also problematizes the notion of intersecting subordination, the primary focus
28
of intersectionality scholarship.” He explains that

25
26
27
28

Id.
Id. at 309-10 (citing his previous works) (internal citations omitted).
Valdes, supra note 17, at 1415.
Hutchinson, supra note 17, at 312.
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[i]ntersectionality, for example, typically considers women of color subordinate relative to men of color and white women. The
inclusion of sexuality hierarchies in a multidimensional analysis
destabilizes this framework. Heterosexist domination privileges
heterosexual women of color (the quintessential subjects of
intersectionality) and disadvantages lesbians of color; heterosexism also marginalizes gay men of color and advantages heterosexual men of color. Multidimensionality, therefore, permits a
more nuanced examination of the operation of privilege and
29
subordination among oppressed social groups.
This article’s multidimensional analysis of grooming codes regulating Muslim and Black women’s hair aims to effectuate Professor
Valdes’ poignant call for the formulation of “critical coalitions that
remain true to social justice transformation both within and among
traditionally subordinated groups,” so that “conceptual frameworks
[are developed] that may help foster a culture of understanding and
30
coalition among multiply diverse and overlapping outgroups.” By
simultaneously examining the contours and consequences of grooming codes that specifically regulate how Black women and Muslim
women adorn their heads in the workplace, this article magnifies the
extent to which the regulation of women of color’s hair is an issue of
significant legal, social, and political import deserving of increased
attention and coalitional advocacy within civil rights communities
generally and workers’ rights communities specifically. In so doing,
this article exposes similarities and differences in the legal protectionism of workplace grooming codes implicating Black and Muslim
women.
This article also contemplates a unique convergence of experience at the intersection of race, religion and gender under the law. For,
a Black Muslim woman who dons a hijab and a natural hairstyle may
suffer discrimination twofold if an employer institutes a grooming
code that bars hijabs and natural hairstyles in the workplace—a double form of discrimination that may simply go unredressed under current Title VII jurisprudence. Therefore, this article embodies a multidimensional analysis of these grooming mandates targeting Black and
Muslim women so that women who identify as members of either or
both constituencies, as well as individuals committed to advancing
their interests, do not devalue their specific, intersecting, and compounding conditions of exclusion, stigmatization, and differential
treatment in the workplace, nor do they construct or maintain hierar29
30

Id. at 312-13.
Valdes, supra note 17, at 1454.
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chical and segregationist strategies and activism for gender equality
and inclusion.
III. HAIR MATTERS: EEOC V. GEO GROUP, ROGERS V. AMERICAN
AIRLINES AND ITS PROGENY
A. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. The GEO Group,
Incorporated
A number of Muslim women have challenged their prospective
and current employers’ grooming codes banning a hijab in the work31
32
place, and some have been successful in doing so. Despite successful
challenges, the exclusionary and subordinating effects of grooming
codes on historically and contemporarily marginalized women of color are illuminated in religious accommodation cases involving Muslim
women. Though technically framed as religious discrimination, I argue that in order to more fully grasp the individual and collective
meaning of grooming mandates regulating what can and cannot adorn
women’s heads in the workplace, it is helpful to conceptualize accommodation cases initiated by Muslim women as not simply a form of
religious discrimination, but also a form of gender-based religious dis33
crimination.
A hijab or a khimar is a particularly gendered symbol of an indi34
vidual’s Muslim faith, as only women wear this head covering. As
Sadia Aslam explains,
the Arabic word khimar, comes from the word khamr, meaning
“to cover,” and therefore refers to a piece of cloth used to cover
the head. Accordingly, when most Muslims refer to the hijab as a
31 See, e.g., EEOC v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (D. Ariz. 2006); Webb v. City
of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Kelly Serv., 598 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2010).
32 See, e.g., EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (N.D. Okla.
2011).
33 Professor Sahar Aziz shares a similar opinion, arguing that “[d]ebates about a woman’s
legal right to wear a headscarf inadequately analyze the issues through a narrow lens of religious
freedom, while post-9/11, the Muslim headscarf symbolizes more than a mere cloth worn by a
religious minority seeking religious accommodation. It is a visible ‘marker’ of her membership
in a suspect group. Thus, the label ‘Muslim’ is both a religious and racial identifier.” Sahar Aziz,
From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim American Women in the Crosshairs of
Intersectionality, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191, 196 (2012).
Another commentator has also noted that the “freedom to wear the veil is certainly, at least
for some women, a genuine question of religious manifestation, but also steeped in symbolism
and sociopolitical meaning that extend far beyond religious freedom.” Sally Pei, Comment,
Unveiling Inequality: Burqa Bans and Nondiscrimination Jurisprudence at the European Court of
Human Rights, 122 YALE L. J. 1089, 1095 (2013)
34 Professor Aziz likewise deems a Muslim woman’s headscarf a “religious gender marker.”
Aziz, supra note 33, at 193.
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headscarf, they are actually talking about the khimar. The word,
hijab, on the other hand, stems from the Arabic hajaba, “to prevent from seeing,” and “refers to broader notions of modesty,
35
privacy, and morality.”
Furthermore, inherent in the regulation of head coverings worn by
Muslim women—like natural hairstyles worn by Black women—and
its effects, are uniquely gendered dynamics of power, vulnerability,
marginalization and inequality. Situating Muslim women’s challenges
to employers’ prohibitions against hijabs in the workplace within the
discourse on gender helps to elucidate the convergence and divergence in the struggle for workplace equality and inclusion among
women. Moreover, to place Muslim women’s employment discrimination claims solely under the umbrella of religious discrimination obscures the ways in which an employer’s ban against a hijab bears on
36
the very nature of one’s identity as a woman of Muslim faith.
By solely characterizing bans against hijabs in the workplace as a
form of religious discrimination, one also fails to acknowledge the
gendered meaning of wearing a hijab post-9/11. According to Professor Sahar Aziz, donning a hijab as a Muslim woman post-9/11 “engenders [gender] subordination in ways overlooked by generic strategies
against Muslim (male) discrimination . . . [in that a Muslim woman’s]
headscarf marks her as a terrorist, terrorist sympathizer, unassimilable
37
foreigner, and an oppressed woman.” Therefore, in a post-9/11 context, for some, a hijab is a symbol of racialized, religious, and gendered
otherness denoting patriarchal subordination, and attendant radicalism and violent threats to socio-political normativity as well as national security, which justifies governmental and private measures to
38
shrink its visibility in myriad spheres. The enactment of grooming
codes banning hijabs in American workplaces may very well be symptomatic of the pejorative sociopolitical meaning associated with this
uniquely gendered religious garb and corresponding animus, stereotyping or bias at the intersection race, religion, and gender. Notably,
however, recent Title VII cases that challenge private employers’ bans
are generally denominated as an employer’s failure to accommodate a

35 Sadia Aslam, Note, Hijab in the Workplace: Why Title VII Does Not Adequately Protect
Employees From Discrimination on the Basis of Religious Dress and Appearance, 80 U.M.K.C. L.
REV. 221, 224 (2011).
36 See Marie A. Failinger, Finding a Voice of Challenge: The State Responds to Religious
Women and Their Communities, 21 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 137 (2012).
37 Aziz, supra note 33, at 225.
38 See Pei, supra note 33, at 1 (explaining that over the past decade, European countries
like France and Belgium have proscribed veils worn by Muslim women in public spaces and that
other European nations are deliberating whether to enact such proscriptions).
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religious observance in accordance with its “neutral” or universal policy of prohibiting hair or head coverings in the workplace, rather than
a targeted employment policy ridden with negative racial, gender,
39
and/or religious stereotypes, bias, or animus.
In EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., three Muslim women—Carmen
Sharpe-Allen, Marquita King, and Rashemma Moss—alleged that
GEO, a private company contracted to run a prison, violated Title
VII’s proscriptions against religious discrimination in its adoption and
enforcement of a “no headgear policy,” which precluded them from
wearing a khimar: an Islamic religious head scarf, designed to cover
40
the hair, forehead, sides of the neck, shoulders, and chest. Specifically, these three Muslim women contended that GEO failed to accommodate their religious beliefs in barring them from donning a khimar
in the workplace. For several years prior to GEO’s implementation of
its “zero tolerance headgear policy,” Sharpe-Allen and King wore a
41
khimar while working. In fact, during their initial interviews with
42
GEO both women wore a khimar. Notably, GEO enacted the noheadgear policy on the same day that Moss, a correctional officer who
recently converted to Islam, sought permission from a supervisor to
43
wear a khimar. Hours after receiving Moss’ written request, two supervisors informed Moss that they were denying her request, and that
all employees would be banned “from wearing hats and covering their
44
head.” On the same day, a memo was issued to the employees stating
that “there are no authorized hats, caps, or attire, which can be worn
45
inside the jail and there are no exceptions to this policy.” Nonetheless, Moss, Sharpe-Allen, and King sought a religious accommodation
to GEO’s “no headgear policy” to no avail.
According to Moss, in response to her request to wear a khimar, a
46
supervisor stated that “no religion would be honored in the jail,” yet
GEO permitted an exception to its policy requiring male employees
to be clean-shaven for male employees who wore beards for religious
47
reasons. Moreover, the women were not permitted to wear khimars
though management was aware of the importance that each woman
48
placed on covering her hair in observance of their religious beliefs.
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

See generally EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 277-92 (3d Cir. 2010).
See id. at 291.
See id. at 278-80.
See id.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 282.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The religious and personal significance of wearing a khimar for Moss,
Sharpe-Allen, and King was further diminished when a supervisor
explained that GEO was unable to exempt Moss from the grooming
policy, as she was potentially responsible for originating “a fad or a
fashion statement because [other employees were] wearing the same .
49
. . headscarf.”
In a weak (and arguably disingenuous) effort to accommodate
the women’s religious conflict with the “no headgear policy,” management proposed that they could wear a synthetic wig in lieu of a
50
khimar —an eerily similar “accommodation” to a no-braids policy
offered to Renee Rodgers, as seen later in Rogers v. American Air51
lines. Contrary to Title VII’s objectives, GEO management essentially presented all three women with the same choice: observe your reli52
gious beliefs or lose your job. According to Sharpe-Allen, a supervisor informed her that if she wore her khimar to work she would be
53
Management informed Carmen
denied access to the building.
Sharpe-Allen that she could either work without the khimar, continue
54
wearing her khimar and resign, or be terminated. Sharpe-Allen
claimed that she informed her supervisor that she enjoyed her job, but
in light of the fact that wearing a khimar to work had not presented
any problems in the past, she would not be able to compromise on
55
wearing the khimar while working. By refusing to comply with the
directive to return to work without wearing the khimar, GEO fired
56
Sharpe-Allen on the ground that she abandoned her job.
Marquita King, who had worn a khimar for five years until
GEO’s implementation of a “no headgear policy,” was also told that
57
she would be fired if she continued to wear the khimar. Due to the
distressing nature of the predicament in which she was placed—either
exercise her religious beliefs or lose her job—King took a leave of
absence from work and returned to work only to comply with the “no
58
headgear” policy. Rashemma Moss was likewise instructed that she
would be suspended without pay if she continued wearing a khimar at

49

Id.
See id. at 271; see also id. at 291 (the court holding that management’s proposed accommodation was unreasonable).
51 See infra Part III.B-C.
52 See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 282-83.
53 Id. at 283.
54 Id. at 269.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
50
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59

work. Faced with the choice of being suspended without compensation or observing her religious beliefs, Moss also stopped wearing the
60
khimar to work.
GEO claimed that it instituted the “no headgear” policy in an effort to “crack down” on employees wearing unauthorized hats or
baseball caps, which allegedly made them indistinguishable from pris61
oners. Moreover, GEO asserted that it would suffer an undue burden if it provided a religious accommodation to its no-headgear policy
in that allowing the female employees to wear a khimar would create
a safety risk. According to GEO, the khimar could be “taken away
from [a female employee] and used against [her], in any form of a
62
choking movement and could be used as a restraint device.” Though
this reason was based upon conjecture, as no prisoner had ever attempted to choke or strangle an employee with an employee’s head
covering or any other piece of clothing, the court accepted GEO’s
63
rationale.
Thirdly, GEO claimed that it could not make any accommodations to the no-headgear policy because it would cause an undue burden with respect to prison resources, as the prison would have to lock
down the prisoners at different checkpoints in order to ensure that the
plaintiffs were not smuggling contraband into and around the facility
64
and to ensure against misidentification. Notably, the majority did not
65
find GEO’s final reason the most persuasive, and the dissenting justice concluded that it could be inferred that the reasons management
offered were pretextual in light of: its inconsistent testimony regarding
the underlying motivations for the no headgear policy; the policy was
prompted by Moss’s request to wear a hijab; a day following the implementation of the policy, Moss was singularly reprimanded for wearing a khimar while other employees were not reprimanded for wearing secular hats; and kitchen staff were still permitted to wear hats
66
though they were in daily contact with prisoners. Nonetheless, the
majority held as a matter of law that GEO’s blanket enforcement of

59

Id.
Id.
61 Id. at 272.
62 Id.
63 See id. at 274.
64 See id. at 273.
65 See id. at 274 (agreeing that “additional time and resources of prison officials” would be
necessary to verify the identity of the female Muslim employees donning a khimar at several
security checkpoints throughout the prison, yet acknowledging that GEO did not proffer a completely persuasive argument that it would be necessary to “lock down the prisoners in each such
location” to ensure accurate identification).
66 See id. at 286.
60
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its grooming code against the three female Muslim plaintiffs did not
67
constitute religious discrimination under Title VII.
B.

Rogers v. American Airlines and Its Progeny

In 1981, then federal district court judge Abraham D. Soafer decided the seminal case involving the legality of grooming codes that
regulate a Black woman’s choice of hairstyle under our current anti68
discrimination laws: Rogers v. American Airlines. In Rogers, the court
declared that American Airlines’ grooming policy that barred employees from wearing braided hairstyles did not violate Title VII’s pro69
tections against race and gender discrimination. For more than three
decades, numerous courts have blindly followed the Rogers decision in
adjudicating legal challenges to proscriptions against Black women’s
commonly worn hairstyles—namely natural hairstyles like locks,
70
71
braids, and twists —in the workplace. In so doing, courts have uniformly rejected Black women’s claims that such grooming mandates
uniquely discriminate against them on the basis of race and gender in
that they not only effectuate unequal burdens on Black women to
obtain and maintain employment but also permit arbitrary exclusion
72
of Black women from employment opportunity.
One year into her position as a customer service agent, Renee
73
Rodgers, an eleven-year American Airlines employee, donned a
cornrow hairstyle, which American Airlines decided to formally ban.
Rodgers challenged American Airlines’ grooming policy prohibiting
customer service agents from wearing all-braided hairstyles under
67

See id. at 286-289.
527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
69 Id. at 231.
70 Interestingly, however, courts have found that an employer’s ban against an Afro may
violate antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164
(7th Cir. 1976).
71 See, e.g., Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *6 (M.D.
Ga. Apr. 25, 2008) (holding that a grooming policy prohibiting employees from wearing natural
hairstyles uncovered did not violate federal proscriptions against race discrimination); McBride
v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv-0196-cc, 1996 WL 755779, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996) (rejecting
plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim by holding that the plaintiff’s opposition to her employer–
temporary staffing agency’s policy of not referring “qualified applicants with ‘braided’ hair styles
for employment positions” was not protected activity because such policy as a matter of law did
not violate Title VII’s proscriptions against race–based employment practices).
72 See, e.g., Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *1 (M.D.
Ga. Apr. 25, 2008).
73 Professor Paulette Caldwell reveals in her scholarly examination of the case that the
accurate spelling of the plaintiff’s last name is Rodgers though the official case name spells it
Rogers. See Paulette M. Caldwell, Intersectional Bias and the Courts: The Story of Rogers v.
American Airlines, in RACE LAW STORIES 571, 571 n.12 (Devon W. Carbado & Rachel F. Moran
eds., 2008).
68
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74

Title VII and other civil rights laws. She raised an intersectional
claim of discrimination, contending that the grooming policy discriminated against her as Black woman and other Black women since cornrows were “historically, a fashion and style adopted by Black American women, reflective of cultural, historical essence of Black women
75
in American society.” The court rejected Rodgers’ contention that
American Airlines’ prohibition against all-braided hairstyles constituted a discriminatory policy on the basis of sex or race.
In dismissing Rodgers’ discrimination case, the court attempted
to analyze her claims as independent and mutually exclusive claims of
sex and race discrimination; yet, in concluding that the grooming policy did not violate Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination, the
court expressly considered the extent to which the policy affected em76
ployees at the intersection of race and gender. Specifically, the court
held that American Airlines’ grooming policy did not invidiously nor
singularly discriminate on the basis of sex because the policy applied
77
to Black and white men, as well as Black and white women. In its
separate analysis of Rodgers’ race discrimination claim, the court held
that a viable race-based challenge against American Airlines’ grooming policy necessitated that Rodgers put forth an essentialist claim
78
that all, most, or only Black Americans wore braided hairstyles. The
court reasoned that Rodgers was unable to meet this prima facie requirement by referencing the fact that Bo Derrek, a white actress,
79
donned cornrows in the movie “10.” Again, the court looked to an
isolated experience of a white woman to determine the legitimacy of
Rodgers’ race discrimination claim. The court appropriated this exceptional instance of a white woman wearing cornrows as its justification for holding that Rodgers and like plaintiffs could not challenge
employer bans against braids on racial grounds, as they could not
maintain that only Black women wore braids and this hairstyle there80
fore held a particular cultural significance for Black women.

74

Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Id. at 231-32.
76 See generally id. at 231-232; CALDWELL, supra note 73 (arguing that the court framed
Rodger’s intersectional claim of sex and race discrimination as analytically distinct claims and
thus failed to recognize that the injury Rodgers allegedly suffered was the consequence of interdependent and mutually reinforcing dynamics of racism and sexism).
77 Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 232.
80 Indeed, the court accepted the employer’s implication that Rodgers simply mimicked Bo
Derek’s corn-row style because she began wearing her hair in a similar style “soon after the style
had been popularized by [the] white actress.” Id. at 231.
75

2013]

A Multidimensional Analysis on What Not to Wear

349

Consequently, the court could not concede the particular stigmatization and offense that Renee Rodgers, as a Black woman, would
experience when American Airlines instructed that: as a customer
service representative, her donning cornrows was specifically prohibited because it did not reflect the “conservative and business-like im81
age” that American Airlines’ grooming policy intended to enforce;
she could wear the cornrows off-duty; and if she were to maintain her
cornrows she could not wear her hair freely but rather she would need
to “wear her hair into a bun and wrap a hairpiece around the bun dur82
ing working hours.” American Airline’s grooming regulations conveyed the message (which the court reified) that cornrows—a natural
hairstyle Black women commonly and most notably wear—was an
unprofessional and immodest hairstyle in need of covering and thus,
an unacceptable and impermissible hairstyle for Black women to wear
in their professional capacities, especially when engaging with the
83
public. Indeed, the court was rather dismissive of not only the stig84
matic but also the physical injury that American Airlines inflicted
upon Rodgers by requiring that she wear a hairpiece to mask her natural hairstyle. In response to Rodger’s claims that she suffered severe
headaches from wearing a hairpiece, the court suggested rather im85
perviously that “a larger hairpiece would seem in order.”
The court further legitimized American Airlines and subsequent
employers’ proffers of such “accommodations” or alternative hairstyles to Black women who wear natural hairstyles that the employers
subjectively perceive as unprofessional or undesirable even though
they may engender physical pain, and additional monetary and/or
86
time investment. Affording legal protection to such subjective policies and practices also reeks of unsettling paternalism, invasiveness,
and insolence. Doing so also confers employers with unparalleled
power and privilege to instruct Black women on what hairstyles are
“best suited” for them personally and professionally. Indeed, more
than three decades after Rogers, employers remain legally protected
81

Id. at 233.
Id.
83 It appears that American Airlines permitted Black women who did not work as customer service agents to wear braided hairstyles. See id. (opining that Rodgers’ acknowledgement
that some Black women were allowed to wear cornrows undermined her sex and intersectional
sex and race discrimination claims).
84 In addition to a Title VII clam against race and sex discrimination, Rodgers alleged that
American Airline’s prohibition against braided hairstyles constituted “a badge of slavery” or
rather imposed a negative racial stigma in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Rogers, 527
F. Supp. at 231.
85 Id. at 233.
86 See, e.g., Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *1 (M.D.
Ga. Apr. 25, 2008).
82
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in meting out unsolicited counsel and limitless conditions on Black
women’s hairstyle choices.
In Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Patricia Pitts, a two-year employee for
a Georgia amusement park, alleged that upon wearing a cornrow hairstyle, her supervisor informed her that she did not “approve” of her
braids and told Pitts “she should get her hair done in a ‘pretty’ hair87
style.” In response to her supervisor’s unsolicited suggestion or directive, Pitts restyled her hair in another natural hairstyle: two-strand
88
twists. Pitts’ supervisor again disapproved of her hairstyle because it
89
resembled dreadlocks. Despite her supervisor’s disapproval, Pitts
90
refused to change her hairstyle. Soon thereafter, the amusement
park’s official company policy reflected the supervisor’s subjective
preferences and opinions of natural hairstyles. The amusement park
issued a memo to employees announcing its new policy prohibiting
“dreadlocks, cornrows, beads, and shells’ that are not ‘covered by a hat
91
[or] visor.” Thereafter, Patricia Pitts, like Renee Rodgers thirty years
prior, challenged Wild Adventure’s grooming policy, contending that
92
its’ banning “Afrocentric” hairstyles was racially discriminatory. Following the Rogers court’s lead, the Pitts court also held that Pitt’s contention that her employer’s prohibition against uncovered natural
93
hairstyles was an act of intentional race discrimination was meritless.
Grooming policies like those judicially approved in Rogers and
Pitts, which bar Black women from wearing braided hairstyles or forces their covering, divest Black women of complete autonomy over
94
95
96
deeply personal, political, as well as pragmatic grooming choices
and bespeak a unique sense of identity informed by broader race and
97
sex dynamics. Moreover, arming employers with unlimited control
87

See id.
Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at *6.
94 Greene, supra note 16, at 428-30.
95 See Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender,
1991 DUKE L. J. 365, 369-71 (1991).
96 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis
Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1112-1120 (2010) (detailing the ways in which donning natural
hairstyles exempts Black women from bearing significant financial costs and time burdens to
achieve a straight hairstyle through permanent relaxers, temporary straightening agents, and hair
extensions or wigs, resulting physical damage to one’s hair and/or scalp as well as negative psychological costs due to attempts to conform to a raced and gendered beauty norm).
97 See Greene, supra note 16, at nn.6-7 (noting that Black women’s natural hair has been
and continues to be the subject of negative racial stigmatization and a marker for exclusion,
degradation, and dehumanization).
88
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over whether and the manner in which a Black woman can wear a
natural hairstyle deprives Black women power and privilege over how
they adorn their heads and limits employment opportunities for which
they are qualified. Thus, employers’ formal and informal regulations of
Black women’s natural hairstyles essentially amount to arbitrary, discriminatory conditions of employment at the intersection of race and
98
gender.
C.

Hair Matters: Synthesizing EEOC v. GEO Group, Rogers v.
American Airlines, and Pitts v. Wild Adventure

Unequivocally, Geo Group, Rogers, and Pitts demonstrate the
high level of deference that courts accord to employers in their enactment and enforcement of grooming codes regulating the manner in
which women of color can adorn their hair in the workplace. Indeed,
in all three cases, these women and their choices concerning their hair
were not simply rejected but also denigrated in the process by management. Critical analysis of Geo Group, Rogers, and Pitts present
striking parallels in the lack of understanding, respect, autonomy, and
dignity the employers conferred to the Black and Muslim female employees who donned natural hairstyles and hijabs in the workplace.
As previously stated, a hijab is a gendered religious marker. Though
not uniquely worn by women, a braided hairstyle is a racial marker,
which can implicate a particular gendered meaning when adorned by
women. Indeed, Patricia Pitt’s supervisor opined that Pitt’s cornrow
hairstyle was not “pretty”; thereby in wearing braids, Pitts did not conform to her supervisor’s notions of femininity, attractiveness or wom99
anhood. Notably, in Geo Group and Rogers, the employer suggested
to its Muslim female employees to wear a headpiece on the one hand
and forced a Black female employee to wear the same on the other
hand; in both instances, management’s response constituted a clear
effort to eliminate or diminish their respective religious and racial
markers in the workplace. Consequently, a unifying thread between
the express elimination and forced masking of gendered religious or
racial markers adorned by Black and Muslim women is the norm of
assimilation or homogeneity that the employers sought to achieve in
100
the workplace.
Furthermore, in requesting and mandating that Muslim and
Black women cover their hair with hairpieces, management clearly
demonstrated its lack of understanding of the particular significance
98
99
100

See generally id.
See id. at 416.
See infra Part IV.B.
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of donning a natural hairstyle or hijab for these women, as well as a
lack of engagement with the women to understand the importance of
the way in which they adorn their hair. Cumulatively, Rogers and Pitts
legitimize employer requests and mandates concerning Black women’s natural hairstyles (which are not afros) in the workplace that are
not only stigmatizing, intrusive, and offensive, but also result in physical discomfort and significant investments in time, energy, and finances. Current antidiscrimination doctrine therefore accords employers a
particular privilege and power over Black women, in that legally protected formal and informal regulation of and conditions placed upon
their natural hair subject Black women to a unique vulnerability, disempowerment, and devaluation in the American workplace. Correspondingly, unrestrained authority to regulate Black women’s natural
hair indeed deprives and tends to deprive Black women of employment, privilege, freedom, equality in treatment and full recognition as
a woman within their workplaces. Yet, in upholding American Airline’s grooming policy, the Rogers court opined that employers’ policies prohibiting braided hairstyles and requiring their disguise while
working were a matter of minimal importance, as they “at most [had]
101
a negligible effect on employment opportunity.” The court further
proclaimed that such appearance mandates “[did] not offend a sub102
stantial interest” that Black women may hold. Unfortunately, antidiscrimination doctrine remains affixed to such notions as it pertains
to the contours and consequences of workplace regulations of Black
103
women’s natural hairstyles.
The Third Circuit in GEO Group acknowledged the unreasonableness of GEO management’s proposal to have women wear wigs in
lieu of khimars, in light of the fact that the women explained they
wore a khimar to specifically cover their hair as an act of “guard[ing]
104
[her] modesty” in accordance with their interpretation of the Koran.
GEO management was quite dismissive of the plaintiffs’ individual
and collective religious reasons for wearing a khimar, evidenced by
their supervisors’ responses to their requests for religious accommodation. By proposing that they wear wigs in lieu of a khimars, GEO
management simply disregarded the women’s express religious beliefs.
101

Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Id. at 233.
103 See, e.g., Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *6 (M.D.
Ga. Apr. 25, 2008) (holding that employers’ prohibitions against natural hairstyles do not violate
antidiscrimination protections against race discrimination because such bans “[do] not implicate
a fundamental right”). See also, e.g., McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-CV-0196-CC, 1996 WL
755779, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996) (holding that an employer’s policy barring braided hairstyles does not violate Title VII as a matter of law).
104 EEOC v. GEO Group, 616 F.3d 265, 291 (3rd Cir. 2010).
102
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The supervisors further diminished the religious significance of wearing a khimar for Sharpe-Allen, Moss, and King and other Muslim
women by equating it to a “fad” or fashion statement. In doing so,
management implied that permitting one woman to wear a khimar
resulted in organized acts of female empowerment on the part of other Muslim women who also wore khimars—perceived acts of collec105
tive identity formation and activism—that needed to end.
Indeed, with respect to GEO management, its lack of engagement with Sharpe-Allen, Moss, and King defied its legal obligation to
make a “good faith effort” to accommodate their religious observances. Yet, despite its claim that no religion would be honored in the
workplace, GEO management expressly accommodated the religious
observances of male employees by exempting men who wore beards
for religious reasons from its policy that male employees be cleanshaven. In so doing, GEO privileged the religious observances and
beliefs of male employees over those of female employees. Thus, one
could surmise that gender-based religious animus or bias animated
GEO management’s decision not to exempt the Muslim women from
its grooming policy. Furthermore, one could also conclude that
GEO’s headgear proscription equated to a deliberate effort to cease
Muslim women’s donning of this particular gender-based religious
garment, and, as women, the attendant expression of their religious
identity and freedom as well as their autonomy, agency, and status
equal to that exercised by, and conferred to, men in the workplace.
Accordingly, it is important to conceptualize workplace bans against
religious attire worn uniquely by women as a matter of gender equality and inclusion and thus situate the legal challenges against these
grooming policies within women’s rights discourse, advocacy, and
106
movements.
Though the courts’ views differed regarding the legality of an
employer’s requirement that a Black woman wear a head piece to
cover her natural hairstyle, and an employer’s suggestion to a Muslim
woman that she wear a wig in place of a khimar, the courts in Geo
Group, Rogers, and Pitts maintained grooming policies affecting women of color that were equally stigmatizing, exclusionary, intrusive, and
105 See also Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 169 (7th Cir. 1976)
(Black female plaintiff similarly alleging that while being informed she was denied a promotion
because of her Afro hairstyle, a supervisor also accused of her “being a leader of the girls on the
floor”).
106 See generally Failinger, supra note 36. See also Aziz, supra note 33, at 239 (arguing that
a Muslim woman who dons a hijab is “caught in the crosshairs of intersectionality at her own
peril” as Islamic, and Black civil rights organizations as well as antidiscrimination doctrine fails
to address the particular subordination at the intersection of race, religion, in gender that Muslim
women suffer).
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offensive. Indeed, GEO management openly contemplated the physical exclusion of Muslim women who wore a khimar on its premises
and in doing so, demonstrated unmitigated contempt for, and control
over, Muslim women’s rights to express their religious identity. One
supervisor informed one of the plaintiffs that if she arrived to work
wearing her khimar she would be barred from entering the workplace,
and that GEO planned to not only prohibit Muslim employees from
wearing a khimar, but also Muslim women who donned khimars while
107
visiting prisoners. By upholding GEO Group’s “zero tolerance noheadgear policy”—again prompted by Moss’s request to wear a
khimar after her conversion to Islam—the Third Circuit seemingly
maintained a discriminatory policy at the intersection of religion and
gender in that it appears GEO Group specifically targeted Muslim
women, the wholesale exclusion of their bodies when donning a
khimar, and the amputation of their religious personhood.
In all three cases, by not complying with discriminatory and arbitrary grooming policies, women of color lost or were at risk of losing
their jobs for which they were qualified. Moreover, by upholding all
of the challenged grooming policies, the courts in Geo Group, Rogers,
and Pitts subjected women of color to an unjustified deprivation of
economic security that employment provides in addition to comparable vulnerability, lack of agency, autonomy, and dignity. Indeed, Black
and Muslim women who feel complete by wearing natural hairstyles
or a hijab yet who are forced to cover and deny an inherent part of
their individual identity as a woman are differently burdened than
other women and men in this regard. For, these women of color are
required to engage in “identity performance” which “can be at odds
with the employee’s sense of identity [and thus] to the extent the employee’s continued existence and success in the workplace is contingent upon her behaving in ways that operate as a denial of self, there
108
is continual harm to that employee’s dignity.”
IV. A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS OF HIJABS AND NATURAL
HAIRSTYLES IN THE WORKPLACE AND BEYOND
A. Legal Protection for Hijabs and Natural Hairstyles in the Workplace
Geo Group, Rogers, and Pitts, reveal that as women of color,
Black and Muslim women are subject to grooming codes that are the
107

See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 282.
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 701, 719-28 (2001).
108
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products of racial and gender stereotypes and bias and they bear
analogous forms of exclusion, subordination, and stigmatization due
to their intersectional identities. These cases also illustrate that for
some Black women, the decision to wear natural hairstyles as well as
for some Muslim women, the decision to wear a hijab in the workplace is an emancipatory act, which signifies a demand for equal
treatment and full recognition of their dignity, personhood, freedom,
and autonomy as women. Despite the similarities in the legal treatment of these women of color and their corresponding experiences,
significant divergences in the legal recognition of Muslim and Black
women’s ability to wear hijabs and natural hairstyles respectively in
the workplace exist, which is important to note.
Namely, with respect to the legal recognition of Black women’s
right to wear a natural hairstyle in the workplace, courts have expressed that only a workplace ban against an afro may violate antidis109
crimination protections against race discrimination.
Indeed, since
Rogers, courts have repeatedly held that workplace bans against natural hairstyles that Black women don, like twists, locks, or braids, as a
110
matter of law do not violate prohibitions against race discrimination.
The Rogers court reasoned that a workplace ban against braided hairstyles on its face did not constitute racial discrimination because un111
like an afro (which theoretically is a protected hairstyle), a braided
112
hairstyle is “not the product of natural hair growth but of artifice.”
Per the court’s reasoning, presumably Black people are born with an
afro; thus, an afro is an immutable, “natural” trait for most if not all
individuals who identify as Black. Moreover, a braided hairstyle is not
and cannot be achieved through the styling of one’s naturally textured
hair; rather, it is only accomplished through the addition of natural or
113
synthetic hair. In its lack of understanding of the diversity of hairstyles and hair textures of (as well as the socio-cultural and intrinsic
significance of hair for) those who identify as Black women, regrettably, the Rogers court fortified a narrow legal principle that protection
against race discrimination is extended to challenges against employ109 See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Jenkins v. Blue
Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d at 168-69 (holding that a Black female plaintiff filed a sufficient EEOC charge alleging race and gender discrimination after her supervisor allegedly informed her that she was denied a promotion because she was unable to represent the company
wearing an afro).
110 See supra note 103.
111 Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231.
112 Id. at 232.
113 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 96 (explaining the difference between synthetic and
natural hair and braided hairstyles and arguing that this evidence may be helpful to a grooming
codes case).
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ment policies and practices that implicate inherent, “immutable” char114
acteristics.
Naturally, Renee Rodgers and subsequent Black plaintiffs challenging grooming codes barring natural hairstyles could not satisfy the
foregoing legal prerequisites for race and gender discrimination cases,
which “simply missed the point” according to Professor Paulette
Caldwell, that “women of color should not necessarily be denied relief
because a challenged employment practice does not harm the men of
115
their racial group or white women,” or women or men who do not
identify as Black. Furthermore, as I have previously argued, by endorsing an immutability requirement, which has become imbedded in
116
antidiscrimination doctrine, a court dismisses the nuanced nature of
the racialization process, whereby the conceptualization of “race includes physical appearances and behaviors that society, historically
and presently, commonly associates with a particular racial group,
even when the physical appearances and behaviors are not ‘uniquely’
or ‘exclusively’ ‘performed’ by, or attributed to a particular racial
117
group.” Thus, the construction of race embodies the observation and
signification of both mutable and immutable characteristics—an un118
derstanding that the Rogers court (and later the Pitts court) rejected
in its adoption of an immutability requirement, which affords relief for
differential treatment based upon presumably inherent, unalterable
physical traits, like skin color, and thereby superficially narrows the
purview of protection against race discrimination under current anti119
discrimination laws.
Judicial promulgation of this immutability requirement is based
upon a legal, political, and social fiction that race is a biological and
fixed construct. As a result, if any characteristic or behavior is to be
deemed “racial” in nature, every individual, if not most individuals
who identify or are perceived as a member of a particular racial group,
must share in or display the characteristics or behaviors at issue. Notably, the conceptualization of religion, unlike race, is not as grounded
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Id.
Caldwell, supra note 73, at 377.
116 See Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination
Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483 (2011).
117 Greene, What’s Hair Got to Do With It, supra note at 16, at 1385.
118 Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *5-*8 (M.D. Ga.
Apr. 25, 2008).
119 See Greene, supra note 16, at 426 (arguing that when courts have imposed an immutability requirement in race discrimination cases challenging workplace grooming codes such courts
have “delineated a clear, yet arbitrary, distinction between choice and no choice and thus what
[is] considered lawful and unlawful in race discrimination cases involving mutable characteristics”).
115
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in this fiction of immutability, as it is pervasively recognized that religion is a mutable feature of one’s identity since an individual can ascribe to various religious faiths or none at all throughout her lifetime.
Consequently, legal doctrine does not require a religious discrimination plaintiff to demonstrate that individuals who share in the plaintiff’s religious identity ascribe to identical religious beliefs and observances. Therefore, in order to maintain a viable claim of religious discrimination, a Muslim woman need not demonstrate that all or most
120
Muslim women wear a hijab in observance of their religious beliefs.
However, to assert an actionable race-based (or intersectional
race and gender-based) challenge against workplace grooming codes
that proscribe natural hairstyles, Black women must satisfy an immutability requirement by demonstrating that all, most, or only individuals who identify as Black or as Black women wear natural hairstyles.
Fundamentally, Black women cannot meet such an essentialist requirement. Therefore, antidiscrimination law leaves Black women unprotected against the enforcement of workplace grooming codes that
effectuate differential treatment at the intersection of race and gender. The operation of the immutability requirement has essentially
obliterated legal recognition for natural hairstyles worn by Black
women and legal protection against grooming codes barring or diminishing these hairstyles in the workplace. As a consequence, employers
are afforded limitless prerogative and freedom to expressly subordinate and usurp an inherent part of many Black women’s identity, as
well as constrain the ways in which a Black woman can wear her hair
121
in the workplace, even though such mandates implicate race and
gender and are irrelevant to job performance and qualifications.
Conversely, as it relates to Black and Muslim women’s prerogative concerning their hair, antidiscrimination law affords Muslim
women a legal right to don a hijab in the private workplace—though
122
not absolute —and a resulting privilege of legal recognition which
Black women simply do not possess. Indeed, Muslim women have
brought successful legal challenges against workplace grooming codes
banning hijabs whereas Black women have enjoyed minimal extralegal success and effectively no legal success in their challenges
123
Despite
against natural hairstyle prohibitions in the workplace.
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See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1285 (N.D. Okla.

2011).
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See generally Greene, supra note 16.
Abercrombie, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
123 See Greene, supra note 16, at 414 (noting the influence of protests and boycotts that civil
and labor rights communities organized against national employers who prohibited braided
hairstyles in the mid to late 1980s).
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Muslim women’s relative legal privilege and success, judicial decisions
that uphold arbitrary workplace regulations, which are fraught with
disrespect for, and refutation of, Black and Muslim women’s deeply
personal choices as women to cover or not to cover their hair convey a
message to Black and Muslim women, as well employers, that the inclusion of these women of color in American workplaces can rest upon their compliance with express and implicit forms of race, religion,
and gender subordination, marginalization, and exclusion.
B.

Hijabs and Natural Hairstyles: A Multidimensional Analysis of
Meaning for Women of Color

In recognizing Muslim women’s relative yet imperfect privilege
of protection and recognition under the law to wear a hijab in the
workplace, it is important not to dismiss the interconnectivity between
the socio-political and personal meaning of Black women’s natural
hairstyles and Muslim women’s hijabs, and the resulting shared and
divergent experiences for these women of color. First, not all Muslim
women wear a hijab, and those who wear a religious head covering
commit to doing so for myriad reasons. For example, many Muslim
women wear a head covering as a reflection of their spiritual and
124
physical modesty in observance of their religious beliefs. Others may
don a hijab in furtherance of both their faith and practical concerns
“such as avoiding the negative effects of obsession with beauty and
125
sexuality on women” like sexual objectification and sexual harass126
ment. Accordingly, Muslim women who wear a hijab often feel that
doing so is liberating and self-empowering and view the hijab as a sig127
nification to others to treat them equally and with respect. Some
Muslim women also believe that wearing a hijab provides an opportunity to contest misunderstandings and stereotypes within both Muslim and non-Muslim communities about Islam, Muslim women, and
128
their roles in society.
Similarly, not all Black women wear natural hairstyles, and for
those Black women who do, the reasons are likewise varied and are
124 Aliah Abdo, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical
Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J.
441, 449 (2008)
125 EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2010).
126 See Hera Hashmi, Comment, Too Much to Bare? A Comparative Analysis of the Headscarf in France, Turkey, and the United States, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
409, 415 (2010).
127 See Abdo, supra note 124, at 449-50.
128 See Kristin Choo, Walking the Tightrope Muslim Women Who Practice Law Are Asserting Themselves in Efforts to Reconcile Traditional Beliefs with Modern Secular Society, ABA J.,
Feb. 2013, at 38, 45.
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129

not mutually exclusive. Black women may wear a natural hairstyle
to minimize or eliminate the physical and financial inconveniences
130
that come along with wearing straightened hairstyles. Black women
may wear their hair naturally for aesthetic reasons, as a form of racial/ethnic expression, and/or to challenge pervasive expectations and
pressures to wear a straightened hairstyle as an implicit petition for
131
genuine inclusion, respect, and equal treatment. Finally, Black women donning natural hairstyles are also simply wearing their hair the
way in which it grows on their heads—with or without any motive or
meaning. Thus, like hijabs for some Muslim women, donning natural
hairstyles for some Black women is a defining feature of their identity
and personhood.
How women adorn their heads are particularly personal choices;
yet, “a black woman’s hair [and more specifically, her choice to wear a
natural hairstyle] continues to threaten the social, political, and eco132
nomic fabric of American life” in analogous ways to Muslim women
donning a hijab. According to Professor Paulette Caldwell, “what
links [an] afro or natural hairstyles and so-called ‘artificial ones’ (such
133
as braids) is a question of assimilation” in that donning an afro or
any other natural hairstyle, much like donning a hijab, can be perceived as a “challenge to the status quo, especially its dominant cultural manifestations, [and] are identified as major threats to central
134
national values.” Consequently, vis á vis their natural hairstyles and
religious hair coverings, Black women and Muslim women are marked
as racial and gendered “others,” as they do not represent the prevailing white, female, Protestant normative standard of womanhood and
they are deemed “radical” or “militant.”
Indeed, the perceived subversiveness contemporarily associated
with Black and Muslim identities and the undeniable interconnectivity
between the socio-politically constructed identities of Blacks and
Muslims was best illustrated on the infamous cover of the New Yorker
magazine entitled “The Politics of Fear.” On the July 2008 magazine
cover, a caricature of then Presidential candidate, Senator Barack
Obama, is wearing traditional religious attire worn by male Muslims
in tact with a turban, burning an American flag while bumping fists
with his wife, Michelle Obama, whose caricature is donning an en129

See Caldwell, supra note 95, at 367. See also Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 96.
See generally Ashleigh Shelby Rosette & Tracy L. Dumas, The Hair Dilemma: Conform
to Mainstream Expectations or Emphasize Racial Identity, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 407,
411 (2007).
131 Id. at 419-20.
132 See Caldwell, supra note 95, at 367.
133 Id. at 391-93.
134 Id.
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larged afro, a military inspired outfit and an AK-47. Most notably,
an afro adorned Mrs. Obama’s head which conveys a deep sociopolitical meaning; for, Black women’s donning of a natural hairstyle—
namely afros—has denoted and continue to denote Black women,
much like the headscarf marks Muslim woman: as an anarchist generally, and as “a disloyal and Anti-American terrorist or terrorist sympa136
thizer” more specifically.
This caricature aligns the experience of Muslim and Black women in very poignant ways in that the afro is central to the signification
of Mrs. Obama’s perceived racialized and gendered radicalism; she, as
a Black woman, was perceived to be “angry and unpatriotic” during
137
the 2008 campaign. Significantly, the cover portrayed Mrs. Obama’s
perceived radicalism as a co-extension of her husband’s perceived
radicalism and otherness cultivated by external perceptions that he is
138
a Muslim terrorist and is not an American citizen. However, in lieu
of portraying Mrs. Obama as a woman who shares the same religious
(and quite possibly racial) identity as her husband—which would have
likely been signified by her caricature donning gendered religious attire like a hijab—the cover specifically locates Mrs. Obama’s perceived radicalism within her identification as a Black American woman who is not Muslim. Mrs. Obama’s afro in contrast to her typically
conservative, straightened hairstyle, much like a Muslim woman’s hijab, is a raced and gendered marker that is essential to the characterization of her as a rebellious and disloyal other who repudiates American values and thus, a violent threat to American security.
Indeed, Muslim women’s headscarves and Black women’s naturally textured hair have been searched at airport security checkpoints
139
as a security measure. According to a Black woman, whose naturally
textured hair placed in a bun atop of her head was searched by a TSA
agent in a Seattle airport, felt that this search not only infringed upon
her personal space but also constituted an act of racial discrimination,
as TSA agents did not search other women whose straightened hair
was in a similar hair bun or ponytail nor was the search of her hair
140
conducted pursuant to a formal policy. A Muslim female attorney
wearing a hijab also recounted her feeling of being the victim of dis135 Barak Obama Controversy, WOOPIDOO!, http://www.woopidoo.com/biography/barackobama/new-yorker.htm (last visited May 29, 2013).
136 Aziz, supra note 33, at 224.
137 Barak Obama Controversy, supra note 135.
138 Id.
139 See e.g., Allen Shauffler, TSA to Woman: We’re Going to Have to Search Your Hair,
http://www.king5.com/news/local/TSA-to-woman-Were-going-to-have-to-examine-your-hair125112189.html (last visited July 20, 2013).
140 Id.
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crimination: she was subjected to extra security searches in airports—
on both legs of her trip—and during one leg while standing in the se141
curity queue, a security guard pointed at her and yelled, “Scarf!”.
Afterwards, she informed her husband that she rather drive 25 hours
than fly to Yellowstone National Park for an upcoming family vacation because she simply was not prepared to “go through [the] emo142
tional humiliation [she suffered] again.” Similarly, another Muslim
woman claimed that she felt “violated,” “upset,” “offended,” and “harassed” by incessant, intimidating demands by National Guard personnel that she remove her hijab during an airport security search—even
after she explained she could not take off her hijab in public in ac143
cordance with her religious beliefs.
Black women’s natural hairstyles and Muslim women’s hijabs
have been politicized and denigrated and thus have served as a site of
subordination, exclusion, and marginalization within personal and
144
professional relationships, and in private and public spaces, like
schools, airports, and workplaces, compelling Black and Muslim women to make a difficult decision not to wear a natural hairstyle and not
to cover their hair in order to avoid negative social and economic re145
146
percussions that may result in “spirit injury.” Yet, distinctively Muslim women (and those who are perceived as Muslim) are often faced
with the choice of wearing a headscarf so as to avoid physical injury
and violence. Some Muslim women are simply afraid of wearing any
type of religious head covering because of the possibility of being violently attacked. On September 11th, 2001, in Brooklyn, New York,

141

Choo, supra note 128.
Id.
143 Samar Kaukab v. Maj. Gen. David Harris, SPC, et. al, 2003 WL 26128443 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
144 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 96, at 1106-10 (discussing how Black women are wary of
wearing natural hairstyles because of the repercussions they may face in their professional and
personal lives).
145 See Greene, What’s Hair Got to Do With It, supra note 16, at 1392-94 (detailing the real
life decisions of Black women not to wear their hair natural while seeking employment because
of their fear that a prospective employer will deny them an employment opportunity for which
they were qualified due to their hairstyle).
146 According to Wing and Smith, “[s]pirit injury’ is a [Critical Race Feminism] term that
contemplates the psychological, spiritual, and cultural effects of [racist, sexist, and like discriminatory] assaults upon women.” Adrien K. Wing and Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism
Lifts the Veil: Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 743,
777(2006). Relatedly, Wing and Smith acknowledge that “French Muslim women who are not
permitted to wear [a headscarf] in school [pursuant to the French government’s ban] might feel
some of the symptoms of spirit injury, including defilement, silence, denial, shame, guilt, fear,
blaming the victim, violence, self-destructive behaviors, [and] acute despair/emotional death.” Id.
(citing Adrien Katherine Wing and Mark Richard Johnson, The Promise of a Post-Genocide
Constitution: Healing Rwandan Spirit Injuries, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 289 (2002) (internal
quotations omitted).
142
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rocks were hurled at two Muslim women, and days later a woman
147
from Pakistan who donned a scarf was physically attacked in Florida.
Professor Aziz also details countless examples of Muslim women
and those perceived to be Muslim encountering “palpable discrimination in employment and public spaces [post-9/11 . . . which have compelled Muslim women] to remove the headscarf [in order] to be free
from physical harassment, obtain gainful employment, and meaning148
fully participate in civic life.” Across the country, Muslim women
who don headscarves have suffered violent physical attacks, sexual
harassment, death threats, in addition to religious and racial epithets
in open spaces, like neighborhood streets, gas stations, and college
149
campuses. Some of these instances of extreme verbal and physical
abuse Muslim women have suffered have also occurred in front of
their children and anti-Muslim sentiment has been imputed onto the
children whose mothers don a hijab, resulting in significant levels of
150
bullying, harassment, and terrorization of Muslim children at school.
In addition to these acts of racial and religious violence, state courts
and state court judges in various parts of the country have excluded
Muslim women who wear a hijab; in fact, one African American Muslim woman was held in contempt of court and sentenced to ten days in
151
jail for refusing to remove her hijab upon the judge’s order. Consequently, the capricious enforcement of “no hats” policies, which exclude religious head coverings, likewise implicate Muslim women who
are court employees and Muslim women who are performing their
work, educational, and civic responsibilities in the courts like litigants,
attorneys, law students, and jurors.
In light of the actual and potential threats to their (as well as
their children’s) emotional, spiritual, and physical being, livelihoods,
and mortality, Muslim women who don hijabs are subject to indiscriminate acts of disrespect and disregard for their humanity in public, social spaces. This leaves Muslim women uniquely vulnerable in conducting their daily lives—a kind of vulnerability Black women wearing natural hairstyles generally do not experience. Therefore, despite
the relative legal privilege Muslim women may hold with respect to
donning a religious head covering, Black women possess a relative
social privilege in their ability and freedom to wear natural hairstyles.
Nonetheless, it should not be discounted that both Black and Muslim
147
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women may experience “daily microaggressions, rude behavior, dismissive statements, or outright disrespect [because of their hairstyles
and head coverings which] [c]umulatively, [ . . . can] have adverse con152
sequences on [their] well-being.”
Furthermore, as GEO Group, Rogers, and Pitts illustrate, the denial or termination of employment across industry type as well as the
deprivation of equal conditions and privileges in the workplace are
real and not conjectural for Black women who wear natural hairstyles
and Muslim women who wear hijabs. Indeed, these are not isolated
153
incidences. Accordingly, the journey for Black and Muslim women
uniquely converge, as both Black and Muslim women are left to seriously (and legitimately) deliberate whether to don natural hairstyles
and hijabs respectively and a Black Muslim women who wears a hijab
and a natural hairstyle may contemplate whether to don either or
both. The next section, therefore, briefly proposes legal and advocacy
interventions to address and redress the intersecting and compounding discrimination that Black and Muslim women may suffer due to
the imposition of arbitrary grooming codes barring natural hairstyles
and/or hijabs in the workplace.
V. A CALL FOR LEGAL AND CROSS-CULTURAL COALITION
ADVOCACY
Though many commentators have observed that courts have interpreted antidiscrimination law in such a constricted manner that
numerous gaps and inefficiencies exist within the legal protection
154
against race, gender, and religious discrimination in the workplace,
continued advocacy to amend the law and its interpretation is not a
futile endeavor. Increased awareness and advocacy within civil rights
organizations concerning the limited and nonexistent protections for
women of color wearing natural hairstyles or religious head coverings
in the workplace are likewise needed. Therefore, this article briefly
contemplates how the plain language of Title VII and civil rights advocacy can be utilized more effectively to address the differential
treatment, exclusion, and stigmatization that Black women donning
natural hair and Muslim women donning hijabs encounter when employers ban or regulate how they adorn their hair.
152

Id. at 246.
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154 See generally, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
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Generally, Title VII cases involving Black women’s challenges
against workplace prohibitions against natural hairstyles, a hybrid disparate treatment/disparate impact framework. In Title VII cases challenging workplace prohibitions against Muslim women donning hijabs,
155
a religious accommodation framework is generally appropriated.
GEO Group, Rogers, and Pitts illustrate, however, the implementation
of grooming codes cannot always be neatly packaged as independent
issues of intentional discrimination, unintentional discrimination, or
organizational necessity. Rather, the imposition of workplace grooming codes can simultaneously disproportionately impact or unequally
156
burden individuals on the basis of proscribed characteristics and can
be motivated by the consideration of proscribed characteristics. Additionally, grooming codes constitute express and informal barriers to
acquiring and maintaining employment across industry and organization type, often implemented without any correlation to job performance or qualification. Therefore, conceptualizing the aforementioned discrimination claims initiated by Black and Muslim women
through the prism of singular, isolated analytical frameworks does not
fully capture the deprivation of employment opportunities regardless
of industry type as well as unequal conditions and privileges of employment that Black and Muslim women suffer due to the enforcement of arbitrary grooming codes.
Plaintiff-side employment lawyers and judges should, therefore,
enhance the meaning of Title VII’s plain language by viewing these
prohibitions against, and regulation of, Black women’s natural hairstyles and Muslim women’s donning of a hijab as a violation of section
703(a)(2) which makes it unlawful for a covered employer to “limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities [. . .] because of such individual’s race, col157
or religion, sex, or national origin.”
Professor Sandra Sperino
acknowledges in her article, Rethinking Discrimination, that
some courts have gone so far as to state that [703(a)(2)] of Title
VII’s operative language relates to disparate impact, while
155 See generally Roberto L. Corrada, Toward an Integrated Disparate Treatment and Accommodation Framework for Title VII Religion Cases, U. CINN. L. REV. 1411 (2009) (arguing for a
more unified conceptualization of intentional religious discrimination cases and religious accommodation cases rather than treating them as analytically and factually distinct).
156 See Jesperson v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
that for an employer to be held liable for sex discrimination under Title VII where its appearance mandates are different for male and female employees, the female plaintiff challenging
such mandates must demonstrate that the grooming code imposed unreasonable or unequal
burdens on female employees).
157 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000).
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[703(a)(1)] relates to disparate treatment. Such thinking is not
required by the operative language of the federal employment
discrimination statutes, but flows from the ways in which the
courts [and employment discrimination lawyers] think about dis158
crimination frameworks.
Accordingly, “[Section 703(a)(2)] only requires that the terms or conditions of plaintiff’s employment were affected or that the [employer’s] conduct did or tended to deprive a plaintiff of employment op159
portunities [on the basis of Title VII’s proscribed grounds.]”
The previous analysis of GEO Group, Rogers, and Pitts demonstrates that grooming codes prohibiting hijabs and natural hairstyles in
fact deprive Muslim and Black women from employment for which
they are qualified on the basis of race, religion, and gender. Close
scrutiny of these three cases also reveals the parallel forms of subordinating, stigmatizing, exclusionary, and differential treatment that
Black and Muslim women experience in tandem with management’s
implementation of grooming codes because of their intersecting identities. Black, Muslim women may also endure such discrimination in
the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment and deprivation of
employment on the basis of race, religion, and gender if an employer
prohibits both hijabs and natural hairstyles. Based upon a pure application of Section 703(a)(2) to the factual circumstances underlying
challenges against grooming codes that bar hijabs and natural hairstyles, such appearance standards violate Title VII’s express proscriptions against race, religion, and gender discrimination.
Though courts often view these grooming codes as harmless acts
of employer prerogative, multidimensional and intersectional analyses
of workplace grooming codes banning and regulating natural hairstyles and hijabs delineate that employers’ implementation and enforcement of these mandates arbitrarily deprive or tend to deprive
Black women and Muslim women acquisition and maintenance of
employment for which they are qualified in violation of Title VII’s
plain language. In order to obtain or maintain employment, Black and
Muslim women’s conformity with such exclusionary workplace
grooming mandates may in effect require their compliance with express and implicit forms of gender-based subordination and differential treatment in the workplace to which other women and men are
not subject. Civil rights and workers’ rights constituencies, therefore,
should begin to address the myriad consequences of workplace bans

158
159
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against hijabs and natural hairstyles through meaningful coalition
building and advocacy efforts.
Viewing these grooming codes cases through a multidimensional
lens illuminates the individual and collective harm of employers’
seemingly innocuous implementation and enforcement of grooming
codes implicating Black and Muslim women’s hair. Uniquely, Black
and Muslim women experience economic and stigmatic injury due to
employment conditions that moderate and exclude their presence—
via their hair—from private workplaces, regardless of the industry or
organization type. Indeed, workplace regulations banning hijabs and
naturally textured hairstyles may doubly affect women of color who
are both Muslim and Black and don hijabs and natural hair. Consequently, granting indefinite power to private employers to specifically
regulate the hair of women of color may not simply reify but also amplify their exclusion from the workplace and corresponding social,
economic, political and legal disadvantage at the intersection of race,
religion, and sex. Thus, contemporary civil rights and workers’ rights
discourse and advocacy efforts that challenge workplace grooming
codes banning Black women and Muslim women from wearing natural hairstyles and hijabs in the workplace should be developed in such
a way that the intersecting and exclusive interests of Black and Muslim women are neither marginalized nor privileged.
VI. CONCLUSION
In its multidimensional analysis of grooming codes prohibiting
and regulating the ways in which Black women can don natural hairstyles and Muslim women can don a hijab in the workplace, this article
aims to highlight the distinctive and interactive nature of these workplace conditions affecting women of color. In so doing, this article
points out that though Muslim women may possess a greater legal
privilege and right to wear a hijab in the workplace than Black women
who don natural hairstyles, one woman’s relative legal privilege does
not override the similar vulnerability, disempowerment, stigmatization, exclusion, and corresponding differential treatment with respect
to the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment that Black and
Muslim women uniquely experience in the workplace. Furthermore,
Black Muslim women may be subjected to a double form of exclusion
if an employer bans both hijabs and natural hairstyles in the workplace.
Accordingly, the journeys of Black and Muslim women overlap in
ways that are not often acknowledged and appreciated by law and
society. This article calls for jurists, practitioners, and civil and workers’
rights advocates to fully recognize the interconnectedness of the experience of these women of color. This article submits that these con-
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stituencies not only enhance the meaning of Title VII’s plain language
but also engage in cross-cultural coalition discourse and advocacy efforts so that the multidimensional experiences of women of color who
don hijabs and natural hairstyles—in the workplace and beyond—are
meaningfully addressed. In this vein, this article argues that more substantive protection for Muslim women who don hijabs and actual protection for Black women who don natural hairstyles should and can be
provided under contemporary antidiscrimination law and doctrine.

